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ABSTRACT
In cooperative wireless networks, relay nodes are employed to improve the performance of the network in terms of
throughput and reliability. However, the presence of malicious relay nodes in the network may severely degrade the
performance of the system. When a relay node behaves maliciously, there exists a possibility that such a node refuses
to cooperate when it is selected for cooperation or deliberately drops the received packets. Trust establishment is a
mechanism to detect misbehaving nodes in a network. In this paper, we propose a trust establishment method for
cooperative wireless networks by using Bayesian framework. In contrast with the previous schemes proposed in wireless
networks, this approach takes the channel state information and the relay selection decisions into account to derive a
pure trust value for each relay node. The proposed method can be applied to any cooperative system with a general relay
selection policy whose decisions in each cooperative transmission are independent of the previous ones. Moreover, it
does not impose additional communication overhead on the system as it uses the available information in relay selection
procedure. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative relaying is considered as a promising
technique to improve the performance of wireless com-
munication systems in terms of throughput, reliability, and
efficiency. In this type of communication, one or more
relay nodes are involved to cooperatively transmit the
information to the destination. Cooperation of relay nodes
with the source node can take place in various layers of
communication networks, for example, physical, medium
access control, and network layers. In this paper, our focus
will be on cooperative communication in the physical layer.
It has been shown that cooperation can lead to capac-
ity improvement by providing spatial diversity and higher
efficiency because of spatial multiplexing [1–4]. Although
much research work has been carried out on cooperative
communication, most of which concentrates on efficiency
and capacity analysis, and a little considers security prob-
lems in these networks. Security is a challenging issue in
cooperative communication networks as the source node
has to rely on intermediate relay nodes to transmit its
information.
Different security mechanisms for wireless networks
have been established in literature. Usually, these mech-
anisms can be classified as prevention-based and detec-
tion-based techniques. This classification of security
mechanisms is defined on the basis of their timing
approach and the specific area of their targeted applica-
tion. In the following, a brief description of each type
is provided.
 Prevention-based: the goal is to employ some preven-
tion techniques such as encryption/decryption, data
origin authentication, and integrity protection. In fact,
these types of techniques are the security mechanisms
that act at the front line of defence to avoid any
attack or unauthorized action by malicious or adver-
sarial nodes and provide integrity, confidentiality, and
nonrepudiation of communications [5–7].
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 Detection-based: the goal is to ensure that any adver-
sarial or misbehaving node that had entered the net-
work can be traced and separated from the network
(e.g., intrusion detection systems) [8–18].
Although cryptographic techniques provide promising
approaches to make the system secure, there still remains
the chance for compromised relay nodes to take part in the
cooperation process and disrupt the transmissions. Another
example is the case where a selfish (and not necessarily
compromised) relay node refuses to cooperate or deliber-
ately drops the received packets (for different reasons, e.g.,
power saving) when it is selected for cooperation. Hence-
forth, we will refer to such misbehaving relay nodes as
malicious nodes.
Misbehavior of malicious relay nodes may deteriorate
the performance of the system severely. This motivates us
to look for a detection-based mechanism that can distin-
guish the misbehaving relay nodes from the benign ones.
To this end, each relay node is associated with a real value
from the interval Œ0; 1, which is called trust representing
to what extent it is trustworthy for cooperation. In general,
trust of an entity is defined as the probability that it per-
forms a specific action expected of it [19]. In cooperative
wireless systems, each relay node is expected to forward
the received packets to the destination when it is selected
for cooperation. Trust establishment is a scheme to eval-
uate and assign a trust value to each cooperating entity
in the network, which enables the trustor (e.g., network
controller) to detect the misbehaving nodes.
In this paper, our objective is to design a trust establish-
ment scheme for cooperative relaying networks. We con-
sider a cooperative network consisting of one source node
S , one destination node D, and R relay nodes in between.
The source is transmitting its information with the cooper-
ation of one of the relay nodes according to a two-phase
cooperation protocol. In the first phase of the cooperation
protocol, the source node broadcasts the information to the
relay nodes as well as the destination. In the second phase,
one of the relay nodes is selected by node D for cooper-
ation according to an employed relay selection policy and
transmits the information to the destination. Note that node
D not only is the destination of information but also car-
ries out the role of selecting the relay nodes and hence is
a network controller. Finally, node D combines the sig-
nals received in the the first and the second phases (e.g., by
using maximum ratio combining (MRC) [20]) and detects
the information from the combined signal. In such a net-
work, the trust of a given relay node will decrease if and
only if it misuses the opportunity of cooperative transmis-
sion or refuses to cooperate intentionally when it is selected
for cooperation. Bayesian trust establishment methodology
is known to be a promising trust establishment technique
used in wireless ad hoc networks [12,15]. In Section 4.2,
we will review Bayesian trust establishment methodology
in detail.
Our contributions in this paper can be summarized as
follows: by using an example, we first show that the
conventional Bayesian trust establishment technique can-
not be directly applied in wireless cooperative relaying
networks as the obtained trust values will be biased on the
relay selection policy and system channel condition. Thus,
we propose a trust establishment scheme for wireless coop-
erative relaying networks based on the Bayesian method-
ology that takes into account the relay selection decisions
and channel condition information in the trust computa-
tion. The proposed method can be applied to any system
with a general relay selection policy whose decisions in
each cooperative transmission are independent of the pre-
vious ones. Moreover, our method does not impose addi-
tional communication overhead on the system because it
uses the available information in the relay selection proce-
dure. Simulations are conducted to show the effectiveness
and accuracy of the proposed scheme. We also examine the
proposed methodology in a multiuser cooperative system
and a cellular relaying system and show its effectiveness in
computing pure trust values for all the relay nodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we will review the related work in this area of
research. In Section 3, we provide a detailed description of
the cooperative system used in this paper. Two fundamental
concepts of trust and Bayesian methodology are reviewed
in Section 4. The proposed trust establishment method for
cooperative relaying networks is introduced in Section 5.
We demonstrate the accuracy of the proposed method by
simulation results presented in Section 6. A summary of
this work and discussion for future directions are presented
in Section 7.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly review the related research work
in the area of detection-based security mechanisms in
cooperative wireless networks. We also review the trust
establishment schemes especially Bayesian trust establish-
ment technique in wireless ad hoc networks. On the basis
of our knowledge, the trust establishment technique pro-
posed in this paper is the first work that considers Bayesian
trust establishment in wireless cooperative networks.
Detection-based security techniques in cooperative com-
munication have been considered in a small number of
papers. Indeed, most of the research in this area is concen-
trated on secrecy rate analysis (and not trust computation)
in physical layer in the presence of malicious relay nodes
[8,9,13,14,21,22]. In [21], the authors considered a source–
destination pair that is communicating only through an
unauthenticated relay node. The goal is to keep the source
information transmission secret from the relay node. The
authors proposed a cooperative jamming scheme to assure
the security of the communication between the source and
the destination. In the proposed jamming scheme, the des-
tination jams the relay and uses the jamming message
signal as the side information to detect the source signal.
The authors proved that a positive secrecy rate is achiev-
able. Although the proposed jamming scheme guarantees a
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positive secrecy rate, it does not provide a detection mech-
anism to identify the malicious relay nodes. In [14,22],
secret communication between the source and the desti-
nation nodes with authenticated relay nodes has been con-
sidered. The message communicated to the destination is
going to be kept information-theoretically secret from any
eavesdropper. In [22], the authors proved the existence of a
trade-off between the achievable reliable transmission rate
and the amount of information leaked to an eavesdrop-
per over an arbitrary wireless relay network. The work in
[14] uses a similar setting and introduces three coopera-
tive schemes including decode-and-forward (DF), amplify-
and-forward, and cooperative jamming. For all the cases,
the optimal cooperation strategy (optimal weighting of the
relay node signals) that maximizes the achievable secrecy
rate subject to a transmission power constraint was deter-
mined. Note that the goal in the analysis of [14,22] was to
keep the information secret from the eavesdropper. How-
ever, the authors did not propose any specific mechanism
to detect the malicious nodes.
The work in [8,9] considered the security issues in the
cooperative communications that consist of multiple relay
nodes and one adversarial relay node who tries to cor-
rupt the communications by sending garbled signals. The
authors proposed a cross layer detection-based technique
that traces the adversarial nodes by using adaptive signal
detection at the physical layer while employing pseudo-
random tracing symbols in the application layer. Note that
the proposed scheme in [8,9] is effective for systems with
multiple cooperative relay nodes without relay selection.
However, for the relaying systems where we have to per-
form relay selection among all the existing relay nodes, this
scheme cannot be applied. Moreover, it does not explicitly
provide an applicable detection-based technique for iden-
tifying the malicious nodes. A signal detection technique
was proposed in [13] to mitigate maliciousness of a mali-
cious relay node by having the destination examine the
relay’s signal before applying diversity combining with the
direct signal from the source. The proposed technique com-
pares the signals received from the two diversity branches
to determine the relay’s behavior. It is shown that a mali-
cious relay reduces the correlation between the received
signals in the diversity branches. In [13], it has been shown
that the proposed technique improves the performance of
the system in terms of bit error rate (BER) and outage prob-
ability. However, it does not contribute to an explicit statis-
tical detection-based security mechanism that identifies the
malicious relay nodes from the benign ones. Moreover, the
analysis does not incorporate the relay selection process for
a system with multiple relays.
As we explained in the previous section, our focus in
this paper is to study the trust establishment in coopera-
tive wireless systems. Thus, in the following, we review
the existing trust establishment techniques in wireless net-
works. A large body of research in trust management in
wireless networks has focused on trust establishment in
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) [12,15–18]. In [16],
the authors proposed a trust establishment method with
high adaptability for MANETs based on game theory. The
advantage of the proposed method is that it does not impose
heavy communication overhead on the system and the trust
computation convergence is fast. However, the proposed
scheme does not incorporate the indirect evidences from
other nodes in the trust estimation process. Authors in
[17] elaborate upon issues related to trust and introduce a
context-aware reputation-based method of trust establish-
ment. The proposed method is a decentralized scheme that
is independent of the underlying cryptographic schemes
and mitigates the chances of having a prejudiced opin-
ion. In [18], a secure authentication approach for mul-
ticast MANETs is proposed, employing a Markov chain
trust model to determine the trust value for each one-hop
neighbor. Note that the proposed schemes in [17,18] were
proposed for MANETs, and their application in wireless
cooperative networks requires further considerations.
Bayesian methodology is a well-known approach for
trust establishment [23,24] in wireless ad hoc networks.
It is widely used for computation of trust in wireless net-
works particularly in [12,15,25]. In Bayesian methodology
assuming that every transmission is independent of pre-
vious transmissions, trust values are derived as the mean
of a Beta distribution function. The parameters of Beta
distribution function are obtained by performing iterative
observations on the system. After each observation period,
the parameters of the Beta function are updated accord-
ing to a recursive formula on the basis of the previous
parameters and the new observation information. In [15],
Bayesian methodology was used to compute trust values
in MANETs, and a distributed reputation system was con-
structed accordingly. The objective in [12] is to achieve
a trust establishment method to have reliable data packet
delivery. The approach is based on Bayesian methodol-
ogy using trust and confidence values that are computed
to construct a reputation model. We will show by an exam-
ple that the conventional Bayesian techniques proposed in
[12,15] cannot be directly applied in wireless cooperative
networks because they do not consider the channel condi-
tion and relay selection in the trust computation. In [25],
the authors designed a trust-assisted cooperative transmis-
sion scheme. The trust model they employed is based on
Bayesian methodology similar to the work in [12]. In their
approach, maliciousness and unreliability of channels are
taken into consideration simultaneously for signal com-
bining at the destination. Although the proposed scheme
can improve the system throughput, no detection-based
security mechanism was provided for detecting malicious
relay nodes.
In [10,11], we proposed a trust establishment method-
ology based on the Bayesian framework. In contrast with
the previous schemes, this approach takes the channel
state information and relay selection policy into account
to derive a pure trust value for each relay node. The pro-
posed method can be applied to any system with a general
relay selection policy whose decisions in each coopera-
tive transmission are independent of the previous ones. The
results of this paper complement the results of [10,11] by
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providing more detailed discussions and explanations and
a comprehensive set of simulations. The simulations are
evaluating the performance of the proposed trust establish-
ment method with the conventional Bayesian method in
single source system (with and without combining), in a
multiuser system with multiple sources and multiple relay
nodes, and in a cellular system with mobile users and
mobile relays.
3. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we introduce the cooperative communi-
cation system used in this paper. We will describe the
topological configuration of the network and the coopera-
tive communication protocol used in our system as well as
the communication parameters and settings (e.g., channel,
power, noise, and modulation). We also introduce the relay
selection policy that we employed in our system. As we
discussed earlier, the proposed trust establishment method
is independent of the employed relay selection policy as
long as relay selections in different cooperative frames are
independent.
The system consists of a single source node S , a destina-
tion node D, and a set of relay nodesRD fr1; r2; : : : ; rRg
where jRj D R. Figure 1 shows the cooperative commu-
nication system used in this paper. The relay nodes are
pure relay stations and do not inject traffic into the sys-
tem. All the nodes operate in half-duplex mode, that is,
they cannot transmit and receive the information simulta-
neously. The cooperative transmission paradigm from S to
D is a two-phase transmission protocol that is widely used
in cooperative wireless networks [3,4,26,27]. In the first
phase of communication, S broadcasts a data packet to all
the relay nodes by using a fixed amount of power Ps while
the relay nodes and the destination are listening. In the sec-
ond phase, one of the relay nodes who has successfully
received the packet in the first phase will be selected by
node D (which is also acting as the network controller) to
forward the packet to D. We call the two phases of trans-
mission of a packet as a transmission frame. The relay
nodes work in DF mode [4]. In DF mode, a relay node
receives the broadcast signal from S , detects it and then
encodes again, and transmits it to node D. All the transmis-
sions from each relay node i , 1  i  R, are performed by
a fixed amount of power Pi . All the links in the system are
assumed to be slow Rayleigh fading channels with additive
white Gaussian noise. On the basis of the channel quality
of the direct link from S to D, we may consider two cases
for this system. In fact, when the quality of this link is very
poor, that is, it has poor average SNR (e.g., when the user
is very far from the base station), then the cooperative sys-
tem is designed such that node D just detects the signal in
the second phase of cooperation. When the quality of this
link is good enough, node D makes a combination of the
received signals in the first and the second phases (e.g., by
using MRC or other combining methods) of cooperation to
create a stronger signal. These cases are quite well stud-
ied and well understood in the cooperative communication
literature, for example, [2,4,8,9,26,27].
Case 1: system without combining. In the first case, the
channel quality between S and D is poor. Therefore, D
does not keep the received signal transmitted by the source
in the first phase for the purpose of combining. In this case,
if XS denotes the transmitted signal from the source in the
first phase, the received signal at each relay node i will be
Yri D
hSri
d
a
2
Sri
XS C Zi ; 8i D 1; : : : ; R (1)
In (1), Yri denotes the received signal at relay node i .
hSri is the Rayleigh channel coefficient, dSri is the
distance between source node S and relay node i , a is the
path loss exponent, and Zi denotes the additive zero mean
r1
S D
r2
rR
1rS −
RrS −
2rS −
Dr −1
Dr −2
DrR −
DS−
Trustor
Trustees
Figure 1. The cooperative communication model.
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Gaussian noise at relay i . Similarly, if Xi denotes the trans-
mitted signal from relay i in the second phase, the received
signal at the destination will be
YD D
hri D
d
a
2
ri D
Xi C ZD ; 8i D 1; : : : ; R: (2)
where YD denotes the received signal at node D. hri D
is the Rayleigh channel coefficient, dri D is the distance
between relay node i and D, and ZD denotes the additive
zero mean Gaussian noise at node D.
Case 2: system with combining. In the second case, the
direct link between S and D has an acceptable quality
of channel. Despite the first case, in the second case, D
always keeps the received signal in the first phase of trans-
mission to perform diversity combining at the end of a
transmission frame. Other settings discussed earlier for the
first case of the model are valid for the second case as well.
Note that the received signals at the destination in the first
and the second phases of transmission are the following.
Y1D D hSD
d
a
2
SD
XS C ZD (3)
Y2D D
hri D
d
a
2
ri D
Xi C ZD ; 8i D 1; : : : ; R (4)
In (3) and (4), Y1D and Y2D are the received signals from
direct link S  D and link ri  D, respectively. hSD
and hri D are fading coefficients of links S  D and
ri  D, respectively. dSD and dri D represent the dis-
tance from S to D and from relay i to D, respectively. Let
us denote the instantaneous signal to noise ratio (SNR) of
S  ri , ri  D and S  D links by Sri , ri D and
SD , respectively. We assume that the noise power in
the transmission spectrum is W . We denote the transmis-
sion power of source node S and relay node i by PS , and
Pi , respectively. Thus, we have the following equations for
instantaneous SNRs.
Sri D
jhSri j2PS
da
Sri W
(5a)
ri D D
jhri D j2Pi
da
ri DW
(5b)
SD D jhSD j
2PS
da
SDW
(5c)
As we explained earlier, D also carries out the role of
the network controller (network controller is usually the
base station or an access point in wireless relaying net-
works) and performs the relay selection process in the net-
work. In other words, D employs a relay selection policy
in which it selects an appropriate relay node on the basis
of the available instantaneous channel state information of
the system.† We assume that relay selection in each frame
is performed independent of relay selections in the previ-
ous or future frames. Although this assumption seems to
be restrictive, such a class of policies is discussed and has
been widely used in cooperative communication research
[26–28].
Maximum SNR relay selection policy: in our coopera-
tive system, we will use maximum SNR policy as the relay
selection policy [26,27]. As mentioned earlier, during the
first phase of communication, S broadcasts a packet to the
relay nodes. Among them, those who have SNR greater
than a threshold SNR, thr, can detect the signal correctly.
Suppose that when a relay node detects a packet correctly,
it broadcasts an instantaneous ACK. Let  denote the set of
relay nodes who have detected the packet correctly. After-
wards, node D chooses a relay node r whose ri D is
the maximum, that is,
r D arg max
ri 2
ri D (6)
Relay r then transmits the received packet to D.
The value of thr depends on the acceptable Bit Error
Rate (BER) for the application running on the network
and also the applied modulation and coding schemes.
For example, for voice and video, the acceptable BER
(103  106) is different from what is needed for file
transfer (106  109). The BER–SNR curve is also dif-
ferent for different modulation and coding schemes [20].
Thus, on the basis of the application, the modulation, and
coding schemes, the threshold SNR is determined. Here,
we assume that the system is using binary phase-shift key-
ing (BPSK) modulation without coding and the acceptable
BER is 106.
For detection at D in the case without combining
(case 1), D simply decodes YD . In the second case, D
will further use MRC at the destination to combine two
received signals from r and S , that is, Y1D and Y2D
[20]. If D can detect the packet correctly, it broadcasts an
instantaneous ACK, and the source node erases the packet
from its queue. Otherwise, it broadcasts a NACK, and the
source retransmits the packet in the next frame of transmis-
sion. We assume that all the ACK and NACK packets are
very small packets and are sent through separate control
channels. Note that because these packets are very small,
the amount of spectrum dedicated to control channels is
negligible with respect to the spectrum dedicated to the
data packets.
We model the maliciousness of each relay node i by
a binary random variable Qi with parameter qi . In other
words, we assume that at each transmission frame, any
malicious relay node i selected to relay a packet to the
destination behaves anomalously and does not forward
†In this paper, by channel state information, we mean the instanta-
neous signal to noise ratio of all the links in the system. It is assumed
that the channel state information is estimated at the receiver of each
communication link by using the existing channel estimation methods.
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the packet with probability qi . Stochastic modeling of the
maliciousness of a node has been appeared previously in
the literature, for example, [12,15,29]. In fact, a clever
attacker may use stochastic malicious behavior in which
it tries to hide its maliciousness for a longer time [29].
In this paper, our purpose is to derive a trust value cor-
responding to each relay node. The trust value must be an
estimate of the complement of the expected value of the
maliciousness random variable (i.e., 1  qi ). To this end,
we use Bayesian framework and perform iterative observa-
tions of the system including the channel conditions, relay
selections, and the net amount of packets received and for-
warded by each relay node. We will discuss about the iter-
ative observation of the system in the following section in
detail. On the basis of these observations, we will derive
a trust value for each relay node after each observation
iteration.
4. BACKGROUND
4.1. Trust and trustworthiness
Various definitions for trust have been used in differ-
ent areas of science. For our purposes, trust level can
be defined as the degree of belief about the behavior of
another entity [30]. The trust level associated with an entity
may be interpreted in two different ways. Trust refers to
subjective aspect of the trust level, whereas trustworthiness
refers to the objective aspect of the trust level. In general,
trust is the probability of the event that an entity behaves
as expected. We use the term trustor for the entity that is
going to trust some other entities for a cooperation and the
term trustee for the one that is going to be trusted on for
the cooperation. What trustor should do is to estimate a
level of trust for any trustee. If the trustor ignores the gap
between trustworthiness and trust, there will be a miscalcu-
lation of the involved risk. By misplacing trust, either the
trustor looses the opportunity to cooperate with the trustees
or the risk of deceit increases. Thus, we should minimize
the difference between the calculated trust and the trust-
worthiness [31]. In the model described in Section 3, node
D (i.e., the destination nodes that is also acting as the net-
work controller and manages the cooperation process in the
system) is the trustor, and the relay nodes are the trustees.
In fact, D as the trustor expects a relay node to forward
the received packet whenever it is selected to do so and the
channel is in good condition.
4.2. Bayesian methodology
Bayesian methodology is an approach that is well suited
for stochastic problems of the type we wish to address.
The following is a brief review of this methodology along
with an example. In Section 5, we will demonstrate that this
methodology needs to be extended to be applied effectively
to our cooperative system.
Consider a single node R acting as a relay node
(or router) in a network. Node R receives data packets from
an upstream sender namely S and then forwards them to
a downstream receiver namely D. In this example, node
D is the trustor whose goal is to obtain a trust value for
relay node R. If node R behaves maliciously, it discards
some of the received packets and does not forward them
to D. We model the maliciousness by a Bernoulli ran-
dom variable with parameter q, and therefore, R discards
a packet with probability q independent of other transmis-
sions. To such a node, a trust value T from the interval
Œ0; 1 is associated, which is an estimate of the parameter
Nq D 1  q, that is, the unknown parameter to the trustor.
The goal of the trustor then would be to obtain an estimate
of Nq. Note that, the trustor does not have any information
about Nq, and therefore, this parameter is a random variable
in its point of view. Specifically, it can summarize its belief
about Nq in a probability distribution assuming that Nq fol-
lows a prior distribution. Thus, at the beginning when there
is no observation from the system, the trustor assumes that
Nq follows a prior distribution (later we will see that this
prior distribution is a uniform distribution). It then updates
this distribution by performing iterative observations on
the system, that is, counting the number of packets enter-
ing node R from S and the number of forwarded packets
by R to D. These numbers are obtained iteratively with a
fixed predetermined iteration period. Note that the number
of packets forwarded from node R to D is known for D.
The number of packets entering node R from S is kept
by S and then at the end of each iteration will be for-
warded to D. Note that this is not a feedback or loop in
the system. This is just a simple message exchange from
D to S , which is done iteratively and helps D to com-
pute the trust values for the relay node R. We assume that
the security and integrity of all the information exchanges
are guaranteed by applying cryptographic techniques
such as encryption/decryption algorithms (e.g., Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)), authentication protocols
(e.g., adaptive and lightweight protocol for hop-by-hop
authentication [32,33], hash chains and Merkle trees [34],
and counter mode with cipher block chaining message
authentication code protocol [35]). Examples of existing
security protocols in wireless networks is the Wi-Fi pro-
tected access protocol, which contains the following com-
ponents: 802.1X for authentication, robust secure network
for keeping track of associations, and AES-based cipher
block chaining message authentication code protocol to
provide confidentiality, integrity, and data origin authen-
tication [35]. Although this protocol was proposed as a
security protocol for IEEE 802.11i, the same protocol with
some modifications can be applied in cooperative wire-
less networks [35]. In this paper, we assume that all the
communications in the network are secure and the goal
of a malicious (or compromised) relay node is just to ruin
the performance of the network by discarding the received
packets from S .
At the beginning, when there is no available observation
on the system, the trustor assumes that Nq follows a uniform
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distribution (the prior distribution at iteration t D 0). Each
time the trustor makes an observation at iteration t 2 N,
it can derive the posterior distribution of Nq at that time on
the basis of the prior distribution of Nq at iteration t  1
and the current observation at iteration t . It then uses the
obtained posterior distribution as the prior distribution at
iteration t C 1, and this procedure continues. The expected
value of Nq with respect to the obtained posterior distribu-
tion after the observation of iteration t is called the trust
value at iteration t [12,15,23,24].
Suppose that the trustor observes the system itera-
tively, and during each iteration t , it observes k.t/ packets
received by R and `.t/ packets transmitted successfully by
R. Let L.t/ and K.t/ denote the random variables cor-
responding to the number of packets transmitted success-
fully by R and the the number of packets received by R,
respectively. Also, assume that D can summarize its belief
about the random variable Nq in a prior distribution ft1. Nq/.
Having k.t/, `.t/, and ft1. Nq/, node D can derive the
posterior distribution of random variable Nq via Bayes’ rule
as follows.
ft . Nq/ D P .L.t/ D `.t/ j Nq;K.t/ D k.t//ft1. Nq/R 1
0 P .L.t/ D `.t/ j Nq;K.t/ D k.t//ft1. Nq/ d Nq(7)
On the basis of our assumption about the malicious behav-
ior of relay R, the random variable L.t/ given Nq and K.t/
follows a binomial distribution, that is,
P .L.t/ D `.t/ j Nq;K.t/ D k.t//
D

k.t/
`.t/

Nq`.t/qk.t/`.t/ (8)
As binomial and Beta distributions are conjugate distribu-
tions, one can easily derive the distribution function of Nq as
follows. At the beginning (iteration t D 0), D has no infor-
mation about the distribution of Nq. Therefore, it assumes
that Nq follows a uniform distribution in the interval Œ0; 1
with mean 0:5.
f0. Nq/ D U.0; 1/ D Beta.˛.0/; ˇ.0// D Beta.1; 1/ (9)
where
Beta.˛; ˇ/ D Nq
.˛1/q.ˇ1/R 1
0 Nq.˛1/q.ˇ1/d Nq
(10)
In (10), ˛ and ˇ are two free parameters of Beta distribu-
tion. This agrees with intuition because at the beginning,
there is no evidence about the maliciousness of R. There-
fore, D may assume that R is malicious with probability
0:5. It is shown in [12] that if ft1. Nq/ D Beta.˛.t  1/;
ˇ.t 1//, given K.t/ D k.t/ and L.t/ D `.t/ for all t  1,
we have
ft . Nq/ D Beta.˛.t 1/C`.t/; ˇ.t 1/Ck.t/`.t// (11)
In other words, ft . Nq/ follows Beta.˛.t/; ˇ.t// distribution
with the parameters
˛.t/ D ˛.t  1/ C `.t/; ˛.0/ D 1
ˇ.t/ D ˇ.t  1/ C k.t/  `.t/; ˇ.0/ D 1 (12)
Note that Equations (9) and (11) construct a recursive for-
mula by which D can easily update the prior distribution
function ft . Nq/ without any need to calculate Equation (7)
repeatedly.
On the basis of our previous discussion, after the t th
iteration, trust value is defined as the expected value
of Nq with respect to the distribution function ft . Nq/ D
Beta.˛.t/; ˇ.t//, that is,
T .t/ D ˛.t/
˛.t/ C ˇ.t/ (13)
This is because the expected value of a Beta random vari-
able with parameters ˛ and ˇ equals ˛
˛Cˇ . Therefore, at
the beginning (iteration t D 0) when there is no observa-
tion available, the trust is equal to T .0/ D ˛.0/
˛.0/Cˇ.0/ D
0:5, and then after obtaining the first observation we have
T .1/ D ˛.1/
˛.1/Cˇ.1/ , where ˛.1/ D 1 C `.1/ and ˇ.1/ D
1 C k.1/  `.1/. This procedure continues, and after each
iteration, D obtains the trust value associated to the relay
node R at that iteration according to (13). Note that as time
proceeds, D will have more iterations and more observa-
tions about the behavior of R, and therefore, it can obtain
a more precise estimate of trust.
It is worth mentioning that more than one stream of data
may be passed through node R from different upstream
traffic sources (because of routing different traffic flows
through R). Therefore, D may observe different observa-
tions about the malicious behavior of R with respect to
each stream. In such a case, a weighted sum of the com-
puted trusts for each stream can be used as an estimate of
R’s trust value.
The Bayesian framework described earlier is a general
framework to estimate the distribution of an unknown
parameter of a process by using observations [23,24].
In fact, if we can model a process in a system with
a Bernoulli process (independent successes and failures)
with unknown probability of success, Bayesian method-
ology can be used to obtain an estimate of the unknown
probability as the mean of the prior conjugate distribution,
which is a Beta distribution function.
5. TRUST ESTABLISHMENT FOR
WIRELESS RELAYING NETWORKS
In this section, we propose a trust establishment scheme for
cooperative relaying networks based on Bayesian frame-
work described in the previous section.
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5.1. Motivation
In the cooperative system described in section 3, not all of
the unsuccessful packet transmissions from a relay node
are due to maliciousness of that node. They might also
be the result of unreliability of channels. Therefore, by
using the Bayesian framework solely based on the number
of received and successfully forwarded packets, we can-
not obtain an accurate derivation of trust values. In other
words, the obtained trust values would not be pure trust
values and will be biased. The following example clarifies
this fact.
Example: consider a simple cooperative system with
four nodes. Source node 1 generates traffic and transmits
the traffic to node 4 via cooperation with nodes 2 and 3
(Figure 2). The transmission protocol is a two-phase pro-
tocol similar to what discussed in Section 3. The channels
between source node 1 and relay nodes 2 and 3 are per-
fect noise free channels. Among nodes 2 and 3, one of
them is selected randomly (with probability 0.5) to for-
ward the packet to destination node 4. The channel between
relay node 2 and destination node 4 is modeled by a binary
erasure channel with success probability of 0.95, and the
channel between relay node 3 and destination node 4 is
modeled by another binary erasure channel with success
probability of 0.65. Relay 2 is malicious with probability
0.35, and relay node 3 is malicious with probability 0.2.
Using the Beta function trust establishment scheme dis-
cussed in the previous section, we obtained the trust values
2
1 4
3
Figure 2. The cooperative model of the example.
through simulations in Matlab. We have assumed that each
iteration consists of 100 transmission frames. We expect
the trust of relays 2 and 3 to be 0.65 and 0.8, respectively.
As we explained before, each frame consists of two trans-
mission phases. In the first phase, node 1 broadcasts its
information to nodes 2 and 3. In the second phase, one of
the nodes 2 and 3 is selected (by node 4, which is assumed
to be network controller) with probability 0.5 to forward
the received packet.
In the first example, we run the simulation for 400 iter-
ations (i.e., 40 000 transmission frames). As we can see
in Figure 3(a), the conventional Bayesian trust establish-
ment gives inaccurate trust values with inverse order rather
than what we expect (it computes 0.475 for relay 2 and
0.425 for relay 3). Although relay 2 is more malicious
than relay 3, it has a larger connectivity probability and
subsequently, more successfully transmitted packets than
relay 3. Therefore, using conventional Bayesian method-
ology, we achieve a larger trust value for relay 2 than for
relay 3. In fact, the obtained trust values are biased by the
channel conditions.
Consider another example where the success probabil-
ity of the channel between node 2 and destination node 4
is 0.65 and the success probability of the channel between
node 3 and destination is 0.85. Suppose that nodes 2 and
3 are initially malicious with probabilities 0.55 and 0.2,
respectively. After iteration 150, node 3 changes its mali-
ciousness to 0.6. We run the simulation for longer time,
that is, 1500 iterations (150 000 transmission frames) as
our goal is to observe the accuracy of trust tracking in the
cases where malicious behavior of a node changes rapidly.
Figure 3(b) shows the trust tracking of the system by using
the conventional Bayesian trust establishment described in
the previous section. Before iteration 150, we expect the
trust of relays 2 and 3 to be 0.45 and 0.8, respectively, but
it returns inaccurate results of 0.25 and 0.5, respectively.
After the maliciousness of relay node 3 changes from 0.2
to 0.6, the trust of relay 3 should change to 0.4, that is,
less than the trust of relay 2, which is 0.45. By using the
conventional Bayesian method, computed trusts at the end
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Figure 3. Conventional Bayesian trust establishment in a simple cooperative system. It is observed that the conventional Bayesian
trust establishment fails to achieve accurate trust values for the relay nodes.
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of the simulation are 0.25 for relay 2 and 0.32 for relay
3. Importantly, this method gives us the inverse ranking of
trusts after changing the maliciousness of node 3. In other
words, although this method tries to track the trust after
iteration 150, the starting and ending points of this tracking
are not correct. Again, not considering the channel connec-
tivity probabilities and relay selection probabilities in trust
establishment is problematic. We will see similar results
for more realistic channel conditions and relay selection
policies in Section 6.
5.2. Proposed trust establishment for
cooperative relaying networks
The problems with the application of conventional
Bayesian approach in cooperative wireless networks men-
tioned in the previous part of this section motivate us to
introduce a trust establishment scheme for the two cases of
the cooperative system (i.e., with combining and without
combining) described in Section 3. In our scheme, the goal
is to obtain an accurate trust value corresponding to each
relay node. In other words, the destination D that manages
the relay selection in the system should be able to obtain
an accurate trust value for each relay node. It can use these
trust values to decide whether a relay node is trustworthy
or not and later take the proper action or remove a relay
node from its list of reliable relay nodes if its associated
trust value drops below a specific threshold. In this paper,
our focus would be on the derivation of trust values, and
the application of those values is out of the scope of this
paper. We will consider both the cases of the cooperative
system described in Section 3 for each of which we will
introduce the proposed trust establishment scheme. We use
superscripts 1 and 2 for the variables associated to cases 1
and 2 of the system, respectively.
As explained earlier, trust establishment is usually based
on iterative monitoring of the system. At each iteration t ,
the trustor (which is node D) counts the number of suc-
cessful transmissions from S to each relay node i . It can
count this number by using the number of ACKs broadcast
from relay i . Let k.1/i .t/ and k
.2/
i .t/ denote this number
for cases 1 and 2 of the system, respectively. The total
number of successful transmissions from relay i to D is
also counted. These numbers depend on the maliciousness
of the relay node i as well as channel conditions and the
relay selection policy. Suppose that D observes `.j /i .t/
successful transmission from relay i to D at iteration t in
case j D 1; 2. According to (12) and (13) and by using
the conventional Bayesian trust establishment, D computes
the trust of relay node i at iteration t for case j D 1; 2
as follows.
T
.j /
i .t/ D
˛
.j /
i .t/
˛
.j /
i .t/ C ˇ.j /i .t/
; i 2R ; t 2 ZC (14)
where
˛
.j /
i .t/ D ˛.j /i .t  1/ C `.j /i .t/; ˛.j /i .0/ D 1
ˇ
.j /
i .t/ D ˇ.j /i .t  1/ C k.j /i .t/  `.j /i .t/; ˇ.j /i .0/ D 1
(15)
The amount of ˛.j /i .t/ not only depends on the malicious-
ness of relay node i but also depends on the number of
times that the relay was selected for cooperation. It is
also dependent to the channel conditions. Therefore, the
obtained trust values in (14) are biased on the channel con-
ditions and the relay selection policy. We attempt to remove
this bias by modifying the trust value in (14). Let ‚.j /i
(for case j D 1; 2) represent the event that relay node
i is selected by D according to an employed relay selec-
tion policy, for example, maximum SNR policy described
in Section 3. Therefore for cases 1 and 2 , we can obtain
the accurate trust values T .1/i .t/ and T
.2/
i .t/ as follows.
T
.1/
i .t/ D
˛
.1/
i .t/
˛
.1/
i .t/ C ˇ.1/i .t/
 1
P .ri D  thr/
 1
P

‚
.1/
i j ri D  thr; Sri  thr
 (16)
T
.2/
i .t/ D
˛
.2/
i .t/
˛
.2/
i .t/ C ˇ.2/i .t/
 1
P .ri D C SD  thr/
 1
P

‚
.2/
i jri D C SD  thr; Sri  thr

(17)
The intuition behind these two formulas is that other
than maliciousness of relay node i , there are two other
factors that make a packet fail to reach the destination.
One is the quality of the communication channels in the
second phase of transmission, and the other one is that
relay i may not be selected for cooperation. By apply-
ing the Bayes’ rule, we can obtain Equations (16) and
(17). Note that the destination does not know the statis-
tics of relay selections and also the channel conditions.
Therefore, the destination follows the same estimation
approach (Bayesian methodology) to obtain the values
of P

ri D  thr

, P

‚
.1/
i jri D thr; Sri thr

,
P .ri D C SD  thr/, and P

‚
.2/
i j ri D C SD
 thr; Sri  thr

. In other words, given the indepen-
dence of relay selection decisions in different frames, we
can model the selection of relay i given the events Sri 
thr and ri D  thr in case 1 and the selection of relay i
given the events Sri  thr and ri D C SD  thr
in case 2 as two Bernoulli random variables with parame-
ters p.1/
‚i
and p.2/
‚i
, respectively. Assume that `.1/
‚i
.t/ rep-
resents the number of times that relay i is selected at
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iteration t in case 1 given both Sri and ri D are
greater than the threshold SNR. Also assume that k.1/
‚i
.t/
denotes the number of times at iteration t that both Sri
and ri D are greater than the threshold SNR. Similarly,
assume that `.2/
‚i
.t/ represents the number of times that
relay i is selected at iteration t in case 2 given both Sri
and ri D C SD are greater than the threshold SNR.
Also assume that k.2/
‚i
.t/ denotes the number of times at
iteration t that both Sri and ri D C SD are greater
than the threshold SNR. Given `.1/
‚i
.t/, `
.2/
‚i
.t/, k
.1/
‚i
.t/, and
k
.2/
‚i
.t/, the parameter p.1/
‚i
in case 1 follows a Beta distri-
bution Beta

˛
.1/
‚i
.t/; ˇ
.1/
‚i
.t/

, and p.2/
‚i
in case 2 follows a
Beta distribution Beta

˛
.2/
‚i
.t/; ˇ
.2/
‚i
.t/

at iteration t , and
their corresponding means are the following.
˛
.j /
‚i
.t/
˛
.j /
‚i
.t/ C ˇ.j /
‚i
.t/
j D 1; 2 (18)
where
˛
.j /
‚i
.t/ D ˛.j /
‚i
.t  1/ C `.j /
‚i
.t/ ˛
.j /
‚i
.0/ D 1
ˇ
.j /
‚i
.t/ D ˇ.j /
‚i
.t  1/ C k.j /
‚i
.t/  `.j /
‚i
.t/ ˇ
.j /
‚i
.0/ D 1
(19)
This result is a direct application of Bayesian framework
(refer to Section 4.2) in estimating P

‚
.1/
i j ri D  thr;
Sri  thr

and P

‚
.2/
i j ri D C SD  thr; Sri
 thr

. The same argument is used to estimate
P

ri D  thr

and P

ri D C SD  thr

, that is,
given the independence of channel states in different
frames, these two events are modeled by two Bernoulli ran-
dom variables whose parameters p.1/i and p
.2/
i follow Beta
distribution at each iteration. Specifically in case 1, if D
observes that the SNR of link ri  D is greater than the
threshold in `.1/i .t/ cases out of k
.1/
i .t/, and in case 2, if it
observes that ri D C SD  thr in `.2/i .t/ cases out of
k
.2/
i .t/, then p
.j /
i given `
.j /
i .t/ and k
.j /
i .t/ follows a Beta
distribution Beta

˛
.j /
i .t/; ˇ
.j /
i .t/

, j D 1; 2, where
˛
.j /
i .t/ D ˛.j /i .t  1/ C `.j /i .t/; ˛.j /i .0/ D 1
ˇ
.j /
i .t/ D ˇ.j /i .t  1/ C k.j /i .t/  `.j /i .t/; ˇ.j /i .0/ D 1
(20)
with mean
˛
.j /
i .t/
˛
.j /
i .t/ C ˇ.j /i .t/
(21)
We use this value with j D 1 as the estimate of
P .ri D  thr/ for case 1 and with j D 2 as the
estimate of P

ri D C SD  thr

for case 2 at
iteration t .
According to (16), (17), (18), and (21), we can then
formulate the trust at each iteration t as
T
.j /
i .t/ D
˛
.j /
i .t/
˛
.j /
i .t/ C ˇ.j /i .t/

˛
.j /
‚i
.t/ C ˇ.j /
‚i
.t/
˛
.j /
‚i
.t/
 ˛
.j /
i .t/ C ˇ.j /i .t/
˛
.j /
i .t/
(22)
where the parameters ˛.j /i .t/, ˇ
.j /
i .t/, ˛
.j /
‚i
.t/, ˇ
.j /
‚i
.t/,
˛
.j /
i .t/, and ˇ
.j /
i .t/ for j D 1; 2 (cases 1 and 2) are
updated at each iteration t according to (15), (19), and (20).
Note that in the proposed trust establishment scheme,
we are using the existing information at the relay selection
process. Therefore, our scheme does not impose commu-
nication overhead to the system for monitoring and mea-
surements. It is worth mentioning that the proposed method
is independent of the employed relay selection policy and
similar results can be drawn for other relay selection poli-
cies with independent decisions in different transmission
frames. Examples of other relay selection policies can be
found in [28,36–39].
6. SIMULATION RESULTS
AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present the simulation results to
show the effectiveness of the proposed trust establishment
method. We used Matlab to develop the simulation envi-
ronment in all the experiments. The topology used in the
first part of the simulations is the same as Figure 1 with
one source node, one destination, and four relay nodes. In
the first part of the simulations, we are intended to ver-
ify the effectiveness of the proposed trust establishment
method in (22) for cases 1 and 2 of the cooperative sys-
tem in Figure 1. The system is using BPSK modulation
without any coding scheme, and the channels are slow
Rayleigh fading channels. We assume that during each
packet transmission frame, the fading coefficients are fixed.
Moreover, we assume that the nodes are not mobile. We
will consider mobility in the second part of our simula-
tions. Because the variations of a channel are modeled
by Rayleigh random variables, the SNR corresponding to
that channel follows exponential distribution. Thus, in the
simulations, we model the SNRs by exponential random
variables. We have assumed that the acceptable BER is
106 requiring the minimum SNR of 54 dB to achieve
this BER for BPSK. As a result, the threshold SNR would
be thr D 54 dB. Assume that the relays act maliciously
with probabilities 0:1; 0:2; 0:3, and 0.4, that is, EŒQ1 D
0:1; EŒQ2 D 0:2; EŒQ3 D 0:3, and EŒQ4 D 0:4. These
numbers are chosen arbitrarily. The same conclusions can
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be drawn for other values as well. We have considered two
situations of high and low SNR regimes for cases 1 and
2. In the high and low SNR regimes, the SNRs of links
S  ri and links ri  D; i D 1; 2; 3; 4, are exponential
random variables with the mean equal to the elements of
vectors .60; 70; 63; 65/ dB and .52; 49; 54; 50/ dB, respec-
tively. These vectors of SNR are chosen arbitrarily. We
have tested the proposed trust establishment scheme for
other SNR vectors for which we obtained similar perfor-
mance results. Note that these SNRs for the wireless links
are achievable depending on the distance of the wireless
link, fading coefficient, and noise power. In case 2, the
mean of exponential random variable of SNR for link SD
is assumed to be 50 dB.
In both cases, we considered the two-phase transmis-
sion protocol explained in Section 3. The number of
frames in an iteration is assumed to be 100 frames, that
is, we observe the system every 100 frames to obtain
˛
.j /
i .t/; ˇ
.j /
i .t/; ˛
.j /
‚i
.t/; ˇ
.j /
‚i
.t/; ˛
.j /
i .t/, and ˇ
.j /
i .t/ in
each case j D 1; 2. Note that these parameters are obtained
in each iteration according to (15), (19), and (20). Duration
of simulations is set to 1000 iterations (or equivalently 105
transmission frames).
6.1. Case 1: cooperative relaying
without combining
In Figures 4 and 5, we compare the trust values of case
1 obtained from the proposed method (Equation (22) for
j D 1) and the conventional Bayesian trust establishment
method (Equation (14)). We expect to obtain trust values
0.9, 0.8, 0.7, and 0.6 for relay nodes 1 to 4, respectively.
In these figures, only the trusts of relay nodes 1 and 3 are
illustrated for clarity of figures. As shown in both cases,
the proposed trust establishment scheme estimates the trust
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Figure 4. Trust establishment in the low signal to noise ratio regime in case 1 (without combining).
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Figure 5. Trust establishment in the high signal to noise ratio regime in case 1 (without combining).
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Figure 6. Trust tracking with time in case 1 (without combining) in high signal to noise ratio regime.
values of the relay nodes accurately. In contrast, the con-
ventional Bayesian method is biased by channel conditions
and the relay selection policy and cannot establish a reli-
able trust value for the relay nodes. In both figures, we
observe that the conventional Bayesian method not only
gives incorrect trust values for relay nodes 1 and 3 but also
computes the trust of relay 1 below that of relay 3. The
reason is that in both cases, relay node 3 has better average
channel condition rather than relay 1. Therefore, it is more
likely to select relay 3 for cooperation rather than relay 1.
It also has a larger probability of successful packet for-
warding than relay 1. Because the conventional Bayesian
method does not consider the channel condition and relay
selection policy in its trust computation process, it fails to
calculate accurate and reliable trust values for the relays.
Another point about these two figures is that in low SNR
case (Figure 4), the conventional Bayesian method results
in better estimates of trust rather than what it does in the
high SNR case (Figure 5). The reason is that in low SNR
case, in contrast with the high SNR case, the average SNR
of relays 1 and 3 is larger than relay nodes 2 and 4. There-
fore, the probabilities of selecting relay nodes 1 and 3 are
higher than relay nodes 2 and 4 in the low SNR case. Thus,
relay nodes 1 and 3 have more opportunity for forward-
ing the received packets in low SNR case rather than in
high SNR case. This is another example of how channel
conditions can skew results and expectations.
In another experiment, we simulated the case in which
the malicious probability of a relay node suddenly changes
at a certain point of time. Starting from the same initial
conditions as earleir, we assume that at the 150th itera-
tion, maliciousness of relay node 2 changes to EŒQ2 D
0:5. Note that the channel conditions are in the high
SNR regime.
In this experiment, we expect the trust of relay node 3
to be 0.7 and the trust of relay 2 to change from 0.8 to 0.5
after iteration 150. This means that we expect to see the
trust value of relay 2 falling below that of relay 3 after iter-
ation 150. As we observe from Figure 6, the conventional
Bayesian method not only gives incorrect trust estimations
before and after iteration 150 but also does not satisfy our
expectation about the inversion of the rankings of trusts
after iteration 150.
In contrast, Figure 6 shows that the proposed method can
track the trust in time accurately. From Figure 6, we can
also see that the response of the trust tracking is such that
it cannot track rapid changes of trust in the system. This
is concluded from the fact that even after 1000 iterations,
the trust value of relay 2 cannot reach 0.5. In Figure 6,
we observe that after iteration 1000, the trust value is 0.55
and still converging to 0.5. To improve the speed of track-
ing, we may further introduce a sliding window in the
trust computation process at node D as follows. In the
computation of trust value at each iteration, D considers
only the observations obtained inside a sliding window and
discards the observations of the frames before the sliding
window. Therefore, in calculation of trust values after the
trust change, the effect of previous observations before the
trust change is reduced. With a sliding window size of ! at
iteration t , Equation (15) is changed to the following.
˛
.j /
i .t/ D ˛.j /i .t  1/ C `.j /i .t/  `.j /i .t  !/
˛
.j /
i .0/ D 1
ˇ
.j /
i .t/ D ˇ.j /i .t  1/ C k.j /i .t/  `.j /i .t/
 k.j /i .t  !/ C `.j /i .t  !/
ˇ
.j /
i .0/ D 1
k
.j /
i ./ D 0; `.j /i ./ D 0; 8  0 (23)
By using Equations (22) and (23), the trust at iteration
t is calculated for the window-based approach. Figure 7
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Figure 7. Trust tracking with and without using a sliding window in case 1 (without combining) in high signal to noise ratio regime.
compares the trust for the proposed scheme with and with-
out applying the sliding window. In our simulation, we set
! equal to 50 iterations. It can be inferred from Figure 7
that by applying the sliding window approach trust value
of relay 2 converges to 0.5 quickly in 50 iterations from
iteration 150 to 200. Therefore, trust tracking is much more
faster in the case where a sliding window is used.
Note that selection of an appropriate window size is
very important in this case. Selection of a large win-
dow size may result in delay in trust change tracking
(such as Figure 5 as the extreme case), and selection of
a small window size may result in rapid fluctuation of the
computed trust.
6.2. Case 2: cooperative relaying
with combining
In Figures 8 and 9, we compare the trust values of case
2 obtained from the proposed method (Equation (22) for
j D 2) and the conventional Bayesian trust establishment
method (Equation (14)) in high and low SNR regimes.
We expect to have trust values 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, and 0.6 for
relay nodes 1 to 4, respectively. Only the trusts of two
relay nodes are illustrated because of space limitations. As
shown in both SNR regimes, the proposed trust establish-
ment scheme estimates the trusts of two nodes accurately.
In contrast, similar to case 1, the conventional Bayesian
method is biased by channel conditions and the relay selec-
tion policy and cannot establish an accurate trust value for
the relay nodes.
In another experiment, similar to the experiment in
Section 6.1, we simulated the situation where the mali-
ciousness probability of a relay node changes at a certain
point of the time. Again, starting from the same initial con-
ditions as earlier, we assume that at the 150th iteration,
maliciousness of relay node 2 changes to 0.5. The channel
conditions are in the high SNR regime. In this experiment,
we expect the trust value of relay node 4 to be 0.6 and the
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Figure 8. Trust establishment in high signal to noise ratio regime in case 2 (with combining).
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Figure 9. Trust establishment in low signal to noise ratio regime in case 2 (with combining).
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Figure 10. Trust tracking with time in case 2 (with combining) in high signal to noise ratio regime.
trust value of relay 2 to change from 0.8 to 0.5 after itera-
tion 150. Therefore, we expect to see the trust value of relay
2 falling below that of relay 4 after iteration 150. As we
observe in Figure 10, the conventional Bayesian method
gives incorrect trust estimations before and after iteration
150. It also does not satisfy our expectation about the inver-
sion of the rankings of trusts after iteration 150. In contrast,
Figure 10 shows that the proposed new method can track
the trust accurately. As we see in Figure 10, the response of
the trust tracking is not such that it can track rapid changes
of trust in the system. To improve the speed of tracking,
we use the sliding window approach for the observation
process as described earlier in Section 6.1. With a sliding
window size of !, at iteration t and using Equations (22)
and (23) when j D 2, trust at each iteration t is calculated
for the window-based approach. Figure 11 compares the
trust for the proposed scheme with and without applying
the sliding window of size ! D 50 iterations. Similar to
case 1, we observe that trust tracking is much more faster
in the case when a sliding window is used.
6.3. Multiuser system
In another experiment, the topology shown in Figure 12
was used to observe how the proposed trust establishment
works in the presence of malicious relay nodes in a mul-
tiuser cooperative network. What makes this experiment
distinct from the previous one is that there are four users
and three relays for cooperation. Each user has its own
channel for its communications. Relays are capable of tun-
ing to the users channel and detecting the users signals
simultaneously. In the first phase of a transmission frame,
users transmit their signals to all the relays. In the second
phase, each relay must be assigned to a user on the basis of
the following policy. Those users whose data are received
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Figure 11. Trust tracking with and without using a sliding window in case 2 (with combining) in high signal to noise ratio regime.
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Figure 12. Multiuser cooperative relaying system.
correctly at a relay are candidates for assignment to that
specific relay. Hungarian algorithm, which is a solution to
maximum matching problem, is applied as the policy of
relay assignment to the users so that the maximum capac-
ity in the system can be achieved [28,40]. Therefore, the
relay selection process is performed according to the solu-
tion of the Hungarian algorithm, which is performed by the
network controller, that is, node D. All the other physical
layer parameters of the simulated system are the same as
before. The system is working in high SNR regime. Each
relay may have a different probability of maliciousness
with respect to different users. Maliciousness parameters of
relay nodes in the multiuser system are indicated by matrix
q as follows.
q D
0
BB@
0:8 0 0:8
0:6 0 0:6
0:4 0 0:4
0:2 0 0:2
1
CCA
Matrix q is chosen arbitrarily, and similar conclusions can
be drawn by using other q matrices. Each element of matrix
q, that is, qn;i , where n 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g; i 2 f1; 2; 3g, is in
fact EŒQn;i  and denotes the probability of maliciousness
of relay i with respect to user n. Equivalently, Tn;i is trust
of relay i with respect to user n.
In Figure 13, for clarity of the figure, only four of
these trust values are depicted. T1;1, the trust value of
relay 1 with respect to user 1 is expected to be 0.2 (i.e.,
1EŒQ1;1). Similarly, we expect T2;3, trust value of relay
3 for user 1 to be 0.4, T3;1 to be 0.6, and T4;3 to be 0.8,
respectively. As it is shown in Figure 13, the proposed trust
establishment can accurately calculate the trust value of a
relay node with respect to a specific user.
6.4. Cellular system with mobile users and
mobile relays
We also simulated our trust establishment approach in a
cellular network with 30 mobile users, 20 mobile relays,
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Figure 13. Calculated trusts according to the proposed method in multiuser system in high signal to noise ratio regime.
and one base station. The cell over which the users and
relays are operating is a 1 Km  1 Km square shape cell.
The system is working in uplink, and the base station acts
as the network controller. The base station is located at
the center of the cell, and the users and relays are ini-
tially distributed uniformly over the cell. The users and
relay are mobile, and we used random waypoint model
to model the mobility of the nodes over the cell. The
power of Rayleigh fading coefficients is distributed expo-
nentially with mean 0.1. The user transmission power is
set to 27 dBm, which is equal to the typical transmis-
sion power of Global System for Mobile Communications
(GSM) handsets. The relay transmission power is set to
30 dBm. The noise power is set to 120 dBm, which
is equal to the typical noise power of a 200 KHz GSM
channel. We selected a 30  20 random matrix q as the
matrix of maliciousness probabilities. In other words, each
element qn;i , where n 2 f1; 2; : : : ; 30g; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; 20g,
represents the probability of maliciousness of relay i with
respect to user n. The elements of this matrix are chosen
randomly in the interval Œ0; 1. The applied relay selec-
tion policy is the maximum weighted matching policy
that was used in the previous simulation [28]. We have
run the simulation for 1000 iterations or equivalently 105
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Relay #
User #
1−
q
Figure 14. Complement of the probabilities of maliciousness.
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transmission frames. In this simulation, similar to the pre-
vious simulations, we assumed to have two-phase trans-
mission protocol, and we used combining at the base
station. We calculated the trust values at each iteration
according to Equation (22) with j D 2. Figures 14 and 15
depict the complement of maliciousness probabilities and
the calculated trust values after iteration 500 (at which
point trust values do not have considerable fluctuations)
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Figure 15. Calculated trust values.
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Figure 16. Error in calculation of trust values.
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in three-dimensional bar plots. As we can see from the
figures, all the trust values are between 0 and 1 and are esti-
mating the complement of malicious probabilities nicely.
In Figure 16, we calculate the estimation error for each
trust value, that is, jTn;i  Nqn;i j. It is concluded from the
figure that the maximum error in estimating the trust values
is less than 0.05. For other trust values, the estimation error
is very small (with the average of 0.0111).
7. CONCLUSIONS AND
FUTURE WORK
In this work, we introduced a trust establishment scheme
for cooperative wireless networks. The proposed scheme
can be applied to cooperative communication networks
with independent channel conditions and relay selection
decisions across different transmission frames. We showed
that the conventional Bayesian trust establishment method
is insufficient to be applied in wireless cooperative net-
works as it is biased by the channel conditions and relay
selection processes. We modified the conventional trust
establishment method by incorporating the available infor-
mation about the channel conditions and relay selection
decisions. By using simulations, we demonstrated the
effectiveness of the proposed method. In the simulations,
we also observed that the speed of trust tracking in case
of trust change in the system is relatively low. Therefore,
we introduced a sliding window in which we compute the
trust values at each iteration on the basis of the observa-
tions of just the sliding window (and not all the observa-
tions from the beginning). Simulation results confirm the
improvement in the speed of trust tracking.
In the proposed method, we always assume that the
transmissions, relay selections, or channel conditions are
independent across different frames. An interesting prob-
lem in this area would be to consider the problem when
the aforementioned processes at each frame are history
dependent. The simplest case would be to model them
as a Markov process. By doing so, a broader class of
trust establishment problems in wireless networks could
be addressed.
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